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ENFORCING THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CLASS
REPRESENTATIVES: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS GREEN AND KENT
Andrew S. Pollis*
Professors Bruce A. Green and Andrew Kent have drawn muchneeded attention to ethical issues that can arise when class-action lawyers
simultaneously represent named individual plaintiffs and putative or
certified classes.1 They analyze three scenarios of potential conflict for
which the scholarly literature has been surprisingly scant: (1) the holdout
scenario, in which “the class may benefit from a settlement that the class
representative opposes”;2 (2) the sellout scenario, in which the class
representative “proposes to settle the individual claim on its own,”
without a class-wide deal;3 and (3) the payout scenario, in which a named
plaintiff “negotiat[es] an individual windfall payout” for herself “before
a settlement is approved, sometimes as a condition of . . . supporting the
settlement.”4
Professors Green and Kent’s focus is to ensure that lawyers comply
with ethical rules when the interests of their individual clients diverge
from the interests of the class.5 And they suggest fixes: class-action
attorneys should provide “greater disclosures of risks” to their individual
clients, and courts should provide “greater judicial oversight” over these
scenarios, including through a possible amendment to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
This Response agrees with Professors Green and Kent’s suggestions.
This Response also suggests that we can address the root of the problem:
the unfaithful class representative. Each of Professors Green and Kent’s
scenarios stems from class representatives’ decisions made “in their own
self-interest,” to the potential detriment of the class whose interests they
are duty-bound to protect.7 So class representatives should be compelled,
as a condition of serving in that role, to prioritize their duties to absent
class members over personal interests whenever the two conflict. This
Response suggests enhancing judicial scrutiny of a putative class
* Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Bruce Green for
honoring me with a draft of his and Andrew Kent’s excellent article and the Florida Law Review
Forum for inviting this response.
1. Bruce A. Green & Andrew Kent, May Class Counsel Also Represent Lead Plaintiffs?,
72 FLA. L. REV. 1083 (2020).
2. Id. at 1103.
3. Id. at 1106.
4. Id. at 1111.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (barring lawyers
from representation involving “a concurrent conflict of interest”).
6. Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1133.
7. Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1088; see also id. at 1102.
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representative’s adequacy8 and requiring courts to police that adequacy
whenever appropriate throughout the litigation. Doing so would, in turn,
ease the burden on class counsel, significantly reducing even the potential
for the ethical dilemmas presented in Professors Green and Kent’s three
scenarios.
Class representatives owe fiduciary duties to absent class members, as
Professors Green and Kent acknowledge.9 These duties flow from their
power to compromise or litigate absent class members’ rights.10 “Federal
courts have referred to this requirement as being of crucial importance in
terms of ensuring due process to members of the proposed class who will
not have their individual day in court.”11 These duties exist throughout
the proceedings,12 sometimes even before class certification.13
A class representative’s fiduciary duties obviously matter most at
particular junctures where they make strategic litigation or settlement
decisions that have negative or questionable implications for absent class
members. But there is no judicial scrutiny of a class representative’s
adequacy at all such junctures. Instead, that scrutiny—like the scrutiny of
counsel’s adequacy14—occurs only at the moments of certification15 and
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (conditioning class certification on the court’s
determination that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class”). Professors Green and Kent’s focus on class counsel implicates a different subsection of
Rule 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). Prior to the 2003 addition of Rule 23(g), the adequacy of class
counsel was scrutinized as part of the Rule 23(a)(4) analysis. See Green & Kent, supra note 1, at
1086 n.8. As a result of the amendment, the inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) should focus exclusively
on the class representative himself.
9. See Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1088 (referring to class representative’s “fiduciary
undertaking”). But see Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 155 F.R.D. 494, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Absent a finding of conflict of interest,
then, no additional legal obligation—including a fiduciary obligation—appears to have been
imposed upon class representatives under Rule 23(a)(4) by the Courts.”).
10. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Traditionally, courts
have expressed particular concern for the adequacy of representation in a class suit because the
judgment conclusively determines the rights of absent class members.”).
11. Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., 509 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ohio 1987).
12. See Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir.
2013) (finding a class representative “owes continuing fiduciary obligations to the class it
represents”) (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Masztal v. City of Miami, 971 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that “failure of” class certification “cannot be used to circumvent or undermine a
fiduciary relationship”). See also Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1093 (discussing class counsel’s
obligations to absent class members even before certification).
14. See Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1086–87.
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (assessing adequacy of putative class representative as
condition of class certification); see also, e.g., Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 131,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that a court can reject a putative class representative where
“antagonism or potential conflict is likely to prevent or impede proper discharge of his or her
fiduciary duties”).
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class-wide settlement.16 So Professors Green and Kent’s three scenarios
tend to fly under the judicial radar. And it is precisely the absence of
judicial scrutiny that places counsel in the ethical dilemmas that
Professors Green and Kent describe.
At the certification stage, “[t]he adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4)
serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the
class they seek to represent.”17 Courts will not find a putative class
representative adequate “if the representative's interests are antagonistic
or in conflict with the objectives of those being represented”18 or where
the economic interests and objectives of the named representatives differ
significantly from the economic interests and objectives of unnamed class
members.19 But that concern over a class representative’s ability to serve
the class faithfully disappears from judicial view once the class is
certified, reappearing only if the court is called upon to assess the fairness
of a class-wide settlement.20 That lack of court scrutiny leaves class
representatives in a position to sacrifice the interests of the class in the
three scenarios Professors Green and Kent identify. It then becomes the
job of counsel to navigate the conflict they now face between their
individual client and the class they have been appointed to represent.
Moreover, when courts assess adequacy at the certification stage, they
focus myopically on conflicts that are apparent at that moment and fail to
assess the likelihood that a class representative will betray the class. For
example, the Supreme Court requires the representative to “be part of the
class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the
class members.”21 That analysis tends to emphasize the pleadings—the
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A) (in approving class-wide settlement, judge assesses
whether “the class representatives. . . have adequately represented the class”).
17. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); see also Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions,
148 F.3d 283, 312 (3d Cir. 1998); Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997); In re
W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 57 (W. Va. 2003).
18. Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-35, 2011 WL 13098808, at *6
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2011) (quoting 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE CIVIL 3d § 1768 (4th ed. 2022)); see also In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08–
MD–1000, 2010 WL 3521747, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2010).
19. See Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1190.
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A).
21. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 625–26 (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 216 (1974))). There is no reason, however, to believe that the Court intended common
interest and identical injury to be the only criteria. The Court borrowed the interest-and-injury
language from cases involving the named plaintiff’s lack of standing, not inadequacy. See East
Tex. Motor, 431 U.S. at 403; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 216. And because lack of standing is fatal
to any federal claimant, it cannot be the only aspect of adequacy that a class-action plaintiff must
establish under Rule 23(a)(4). Such a construction would also render Rule 23(a)(4) superfluous
in light of the separate typicality requirement found in Rule 23(a)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
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underlying “conduct alleged to be wrongful”22 or the “relief sought” in
the case.23 But the conflicts reflected in Professors Green and Kent’s three
scenarios are of a different character; they derive not from the named
plaintiff’s antagonism for the pleaded claims, but instead from the
leverage the named plaintiff acquires as a result of the appointment. Two
of their scenarios reflect not mere violations of the class representative’s
fiduciary obligations, but rather brazen efforts to exploit the position for
personal gain.24
To be sure, some courts at the certification stage also “consider the
honesty and trustworthiness of the named plaintiff.”25 Some go so far as
to require the named plaintiff to “exhibit enough integrity and credibility
to convince the court that the named plaintiff will diligently perform its
fiduciary duties to the class.” But even those courts that scrutinize the
character of the named plaintiff do so only predictively. Apart from the
settlement-approval process,26 Rule 23 contains no textual provision for
evaluating the class representative’s ongoing performance, even though
a “[b]asic consideration of fairness” would seem to require it.27
And, while the Rule 23(a) factors “tend to merge,” the Supreme Court has observed that “concerns
. . . about conflict of interest” are unique to the “adequacy-of-representation requirement” of
Rule 23(a)(4). See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 n.13 (1982). So, any
behavior on the part of a class representative that stems from a conflict with the absent class
members is inconsistent with the fiduciary duties a class representative undertakes in assuming
that role.
22. See Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1190 (“[N]o circuit has approved of class certification
where some class members derive a net economic benefit from the very same conduct alleged to
be wrongful by the named representatives of the class.”).
23. See, e.g., Safi v. Cent. Parking Sys. of Ohio, Inc., 45 N.E.3d 249, 255 (Ohio Ct. App.
2015) (“To ensure that the interests of the representative parties are coextensive with and not
antagonistic to the interests of the absent class members, all class members must benefit from the
relief sought.”).
24. The two in question are the sellout and payout scenarios. In the sellout scenario, the
class representative obtains a favorable settlement for herself only by exploiting (and ultimately
negotiating away) the power to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of the class. See Green & Kent,
supra note 1, at 1107. In the payout scenario, the class representative exploits her fiduciary
obligations by extracting an up-front price for supporting a class-wide settlement proposal. See
id. at 1111. In both scenarios, “the class action procedure enables [the class representative] to
benefit financially at the class’s expense.” Id. at 1088.
25. See, e.g., Savino v. Comput. Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998).
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A).
27. See Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1984); see also
Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1977); Nat’l Ass’n of Reg’l Med.
Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 344–45 (D.C. Cir. 1976). These authorities call for “a
stringent and continuing examination of the adequacy of representation by the named class
representatives,” not just at the certification stage but “at all stages of the litigation where absent
members will be bound by the court's judgment.” E.g., Mathews, 551 F.2d at 344–45 (emphasis
added). Professors Green and Kent’s scenarios do not necessarily bind absent class members, at
least not directly. For example, the sellout scenario doesn’t necessarily preclude any class
member’s ability to pursue her claims individually or through another certified class, at least if
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An underlying premise of Professors Green and Kent’s concerns is
that the class representative is not accountable for the decision to forego
her allegiance to absent class members. Professors Green and Kent
explain, for example, that “nothing binds” the class representative “to
earlier assurances” to “stay the course.”28 This Response suggests that if
the underlying premise is shifted—if class representatives are required to
stay the course as a condition of their appointment and retention—then
the risk of conflict for counsel dissipates substantially.
That reemphasis on the class representative’s loyalty could eliminate
many instances of the sellout scenario.29 Rule 23 can be amended to
require a named plaintiff in a putative class action to sign an undertaking,
filed with the first pleading seeking class-wide relief, agreeing not to
compromise her individual claim without obtaining court approval (and
to disgorge any settlement proceeds received without court approval).30
In determining whether to approve such a settlement, the court can
consider the individual’s motives and the implications for the class. For
example, the court can deny the motion if it concludes that the individual
exploited the class-action process for their own benefit or that it would
compromise the absent class members’ claims. By contrast, the court
could grant the motion if it concludes that the circumstances surrounding
the settlement are reasonable (such as the onset of illness or other
development that may prevent the individual from serving adequately).
Likewise, the court could grant the motion if another adequate class
member steps forward to assume the representative’s duties.
Requiring the individual plaintiff to seek court approval for settling
their individual claim could still present a conflict for class counsel,
because that settlement is presumptively antagonistic to the interests of
the putative class. So the named plaintiff may require separate counsel to
prosecute the motion. Even then, class counsel would have the difficulties
that Professors Green and Kent identify.31 But the undertaking
the statute of limitations has not yet passed. But the potential adverse impact is nevertheless patent
and calls for scrutiny of the class representative’s behavior.
28. Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1108.
29. See id. at 1106–10.
30. Such an undertaking would not affect a defendant’s ability to compromise the interests
of putative class members by paying to the named plaintiff, before certification, the full value of
her claim, thus rendering it moot. We know that the mere offer to pay is not enough if the plaintiff
rejects the offer. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 153 (2016). But the result is
less clear if the money is actually tendered to the plaintiff. See id. at 166; see also Radha
Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc, Inc., 909 F.3d 534, 543 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that any tender
would render a named plaintiff’s claims moot only if it includes the amount the named plaintiff
anticipates for her service as class representative). These issues present no particular ethical
problem for counsel, so long as the named plaintiff resists the resolution, as the absent class
members would presumably want her to do.
31. Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1108–10.
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requirement would emphasize to putative class representatives the
importance of their fiduciary obligations and would work hand in glove
with Professors Green and Kent’s suggestion that counsel provide
“greater disclosure of risks” to their potential clients.32
The undertaking this Response proposes could also preclude named
representatives from negotiating any pre-settlement agreements that fall
into the payout scenario33 (and, again, requiring them to disgorge any
funds delivered to them in connection with a settlement that violates that
undertaking). These “incentive awards”34 serve no purpose other than to
compensate the representative, but when used improperly can harm the
absent class members.35 While compensation for class representatives
can certainly be appropriate,36 the only way to ensure that such
compensation does not undermine the absent class members’ interests is
to negotiate the amount after the court approves a class-wide settlement.37
In the absence of an agreement about the award, the class representative
should be able to present the issue for the court’s resolution following the
approval of a class-wide settlement, just as attorney fees are often the
subject of after-the-fact determination.38
The holdout scenario39 is more difficult, however, because it is not
necessarily a product of a class representative’s disregard of her fiduciary
duties. As Professors Green and Kent note, “[t]he class representative
may simply disagree with class counsel or other class members about the

32. See id. at 1133; see also id. at 1091 (recommending that counsel explain “how the class
action will limit their ability to act and give advice for the individual’s benefit, and how they will
respond if a conflict of interest later precludes serving both the client and the class”). Professors
Green and Kent also suggest that a client’s up-front agreement not to pursue “an individual
settlement” cannot be “a condition of the retention.” Id. at 1110 (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)). However true that may be for individual clients who
owe no fiduciary duties to anyone else in the litigation, that concept runs counter to the purpose
of the class-action vehicle. Furthermore, the relevant language of the rule requires a lawyer to
“abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter,” and the verification this Response
proposes would be a record of that decision and should be no more revocable thereafter than a
consummated settlement. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
33. See Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1110–13.
34. Id. at 1111.
35. See id. at 1111–12.
36. See, e.g., Cisneros v. EP Wrap-It Insulation, LLC, No. 19-500 GBW/GJF, 2022 WL
2304146, at *10 (D.N.M. June 27, 2022) (“[I]ncentive awards to class representatives in wage
and hour litigation are appropriate when they compensate those individuals for the employmentrelated risks they bear in bringing forward claims on behalf of a class and for their additional
efforts that have benefitted the class.”).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). Perhaps an amendment to Rule 23 authorizing such an award
would facilitate the process, particularly if the rule articulated the standards the court should apply
in determining a reasonable post-settlement award.
39. See Green & Kent, supra note 1, at 1103–06.
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advisability of a proposed settlement.”40 So when a class representative
believes in good faith that a particular settlement offer disserves the
absent class members—and counsel disagrees—the ethical conflict is
harder to overcome. But the class representative’s ability to serve as an
adequate fiduciary for the class—if properly scrutinized at the classcertification stage and thereafter as frequently as circumstances dictate—
should cloak that class representative with the power to reject a settlement
offer, even over counsel’s objection. Only if counsel cannot in good
conscience support that rejection should she attempt to override that
decision, and the ensuing conflict would then certainly implicate all the
problems that Professors Green and Kent identify.
In sum, I applaud Professors Green and Kent for their excellent article
drawing attention to these important issues. This Response fully endorses
their recommendations and suggests that greater emphasis on the serious
fiduciary duties that class representatives assume would present fewer
scenarios that create problems for class counsel who also represent named
plaintiffs individually.

40. Id. at 1103.

